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ABSTRACT
The h g h  degree of variabilit ot the Italian political 
performance has been attributed to many different combinations of 
causal factors, most of which have included, in some form, the 
Italian economic performance. This analysis seeks to establish 
the nature of the relationship between Italy's political and 
economic performance rather than establish causality. The thesis 
proceeds by 1) constructing operational indexes for Italian 
political and economic performance, 2 ) utilizing the indexes in 
rejecting the hypothesis that increasing economic performance 
gives rise to ever increasing political performance, and 3 ) 
extracting a model (via the Gauss-Newton non-linear regression 
technique) illustrating that the relationship is actually an 
inverse quadratic one.
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SECTION 1.
INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies have been conducted that examine the impact 
of various forces on the political performances of selected 
nations. Those works have usually employed multiple-regression 
or some sort of autoregressive time series analysis to determine 
the relationships between 1 ) groups of salient (to the general 
populace) economic independent variables and 2 ) a dependent 
political performance indicator or a type of voting pattern 
indicator. These methodologies are very specific. They tend to 
focus on a select group of economic variables that may not fully 
indicate general economic performance. Furthermore, relying on 
surveys can be problematic. Although the techniques are 
improving, they are still subject to a great deal of judgement on 
the part of the researchers and respondents. Too much reliance
on judgement can damage the reliability of the measurements. 
Election results are interesting measuring devices but they may 
not be fully representative of political performance either. Too 
many of the other actions that the general populace engages in 
are unaccounted for. The point is that political performance 
need not be measured via the indirect path of demand placement 
through elections nor subjective based survey results. It can 
also be measured by looking directly at political events data.
In this study, a more encompassing measure of economic 
performance is utilized; it is a broad based model similar to the
1
2U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis' composite economic index. 
Similarly, this study attempts to construct a more objective, 
overall measurement of political performance via events data.
The political performance indicator is more objective 
because it relies on actual events data to measure different 
aspects of performance. At the individual events variable level, 
the composite index is free from the effects of biased reporting 
because it is only the event or behavior that is recorded. 1 Only 
at the construction level (variable weighting) is the composite 
index forced to rely on judgement; thus minimizing error (in this 
study, it is necessarily the author's judgement).
The purpose of this study is to determine the broad, long­
term relationship between economic and political performance in 
Italy from 1948 to 1977. Politico-economic analysis is an 
increasingly important interdisciplinary field that needs to be 
explored much further given the real-world binding of the two 
phenomena.
SECTION 2.
REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE
’‘Partial” politico-economic interdependence models usually 
study the interrelationship between a particular set of 
independent variables (such as inflation, unemployment, or wage
'The benefits of events data usage are similar to those of 
content analysis which only considers column space to issues as 
the determining factor of importance; not reporters' opinions.
3fluctuations) and a dependent variable (such as a subjective 
measurement of political support or voter results). In the 
United States, there has been extensive work with respect to 
basic economic indicators' effects on presidential popularity 
(Shapiro and Conforto 1980; Monroe and Laughlin 1983; Norpoth and 
Yantek 1983). A majority of the studies agree about the 
importance of economic conditions on the public's assessment 
of executive (government) performance as well as on the impact of 
election outcomes (Fiorina 1981; Klukinski and West 1981; Feldman 
1982; Lijphart 1982).
Generally, studies of Western Europe have also agreed on the 
importance of economic indicators--particularly unemployment and 
inflation--in relation to various aspects of government 
performance (Hibbs and Vasilatos 1981; Hibbs 1982; Robertson 
1983, 1984; Franz 1986; Kirchgassner 1986; Whiteley 1986).
Works concentrating on Italy have not been as numerous. 
However, several authors have published papers employing 
regression and autoregression analysis to relate economic effects 
to the percentage of legislative votes for left-wing parties. 
Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Paolo Bellucci (1982) found that 
"worsening aggregate economic conditions significantly increase 
the legislative vote for leftist parties, which have 
traditionally played on opposition role". Bellucci (1984) found 
that increasing rates of inflation penalized the Christian 
Democratic party and strengthened the Communists while increasing
4unemployment rates had an opposite effect. In a comparative 
study of Britain* France, Germany, and Italy, Lewis-Beck (1985) 
concluded that while economic indicators are relatively important 
vote determinants in all the cases, only in Italy are the social 
cleavages of class and religion more important.
Italy is truly an interesting case due to the wealth of 
conflicting literary and journal works that have been published. 
Conflicting points of view can easily give rise to conflicting 
conclusions in literary arguments. And in the quantitative 
studies reviewed above, the scopes of analysis have been 
relatively limited thus giving rise to seemingly contradictory 
results. Particularly if the results are elevated to a broader 
plane.
SECTION 3.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The general theoretical framework consists of a macro­
system explanation of political-economic relationships. It is 
based on the public choice political theory which assumes that 
individualistic (economic) models of behavior determines the 
actions of both political and economic decision-makers. 2 
Specifically, political performance, which may be conceptualized
2 In other words, the actors primarily consider their own 
advantages constrained only by secondary outside forces. See 
Bruno S. Frey (1980) and Paul Whiteley (1980) for complete 
discussions of the macro-system framework of analysis.
as the level of demands responsiveness and demands satisfaction, 
is believed to be strongly determined by economic performance, 
which is conceptions 1 ized as the level of microeconomic well­
being and security as well as the macroeconomic ability to 
provide future levels of microeconomic benefits.’
With the "systems model" in place, an intriguing question 
arises. Empirically, does increasing economic performance relate 
positively to political performance to a significant degree? 
This analysis hypothesizes theoretically that this relationship 
does indeed hold.
SECTION 4.
PRINCIPAL HYPOTHESES
Political performance is defined generically as 
P~f(P, ,p? . . . .pfl ) ,
where pn are events data variables. Economic performance is 
defined generically as 
E~f(e1 * e2 % • • • on )♦
where en are selected economic variables. Both composite 
indicators are explicitly operationalized in the following 
section.
’Karl W. Deutsch (1970, 199-223) emphasizes "effectiveness" 
(the ability to make an unlikely outcome more likely) and 
"efficiency" (the ratio of the change in effectiveness to the 
cost of the change) as the two components of political 
performance. It is reasonable to hypothesize that an increase in 
economic assets will increase both effectiveness and efficiency. 
As the political system devotes more resources to make unlikely 
outcomes more likely and find better ways to minimize cost, 
political performance should increase.
6The research hypothesis is that the function relating 
political performance (P) to economic performance (E) is an 
increasing one that must necessarily increase at a decreasing 
rate due to diminishing returns. It is determined by 
P=f(E)
and more explicitly in the following equation 
11] f(E)=ln(kE)
Statistical estimation and testing of the logarithmic model
will proceed by fitting the hypothesized model [equation 1 ) to
the observed values of the indexes. Then a maximum likelihood
estimate of the constant k will yield predicted values of P,
giv#n as p. As a measure of the goodness of-fit between the
observed P and p, the statistic
w=SUMr, v<ir „ I (P, -p, )'/Pi 1 . asymtotic to X2 0 o *
will be calculated where
i observation 
n=30 years
X2=Chi~squared statistic 
0.05=level of test statistic
: f (E) is logari thmic will be rejected at 5 percent if w>X2 and 
H, :f(E) is some other function will be accepted at 5 percent if
w<X2 .
7SECTION 5.
METHOD OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data Sources, Selection, and Preparation
The method of empirical analysis utilizes an existing data 
set archived on magnetic tape in the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political Research, at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
to operationalize the concept of political performance. The 
single nation reliability of the Consortium data is subject to 
time-span problems of events data coding and the problems 
associated with inter-coder reliability, however, multiple source 
merging, strict selection criteria for coders, and rigorous coder 
training have minimized reliability problems. The validity of 
the data itself is also maximized through multiple source merging 
and coder preparation. 4 Problems related to cross-national 
validity are not encountered in a single case study.
Empirical data used in the operationalization of economic 
performance is drawn from the United Nations, New York, and the 
Istituto Centrale di Statistjca, Rome. Economic data is often 
subject to reliability problems in the form of base period 
changes across time, however, splicing techniques are employed to 
connect and smooth the series thereby alleviating the problem. 5
4 See Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson (1972, 391- 
423) for a complete discussion of the Consortium data. Note that 
the data is believed to be valid in that particular variables 
measure what they are supposed to measure. The author must take 
the credit or blame for the final index validity.
sThe accounting method for unemployment was changed in 1955 
and then changed back to the original method in 1965. Values for 
this period were linearly interpolated to maintain continuity.
8Although Italy does not have a reputation for stringent 
accounting standards, this is assumed to be constant over time 
and the data is considered valid.
The sample data spans the period of 1948 to 1977, yielding 
thirty observations. Data prior to this time can not be 
considered reliable or complete and there is currently a lack of 
Consortium political data from 1978 to the present.
Pearson correlation coefficients are calculated within the 
political and economic data sets to identify variables that 
appeared to measure the same phenomena. None of the original
political variables have been removed due to correlation 
problems. However, several of the original economic variables 
are highly correlated and the most representative variables of 
the correlated subgroups have been chosen to remain in the index 
construction. 6
Univariate analysis is then employed on the surviving data 
set to identify variables that are from normal distributions and 
therefore susceptible to the standardization necessary in 
combining them into a common scale. Of the surviving indicators, 
all but three political variables are standardized to a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one (m=0 ; sd=l).
6 Examples of highly correlated variables were: GNP, GDP, and 
per capita GNP; consumer price index and whosale price index; 
declared bankruptcies and closures; workers strikes and the 
numbers of workers involved in strikes.
9The three non-normally distributed variables are included as 
dummy variables in the index construction. The surviving 
variables are believed to be useful indicators of political and 
economic performance.
Index Construction
Political action (specifically policy outputs) results in 
performance levels which in turn manifest demand and support 
actions of the general populace (events data). Some of the 
events data can be tapped to directly measure the general 
populace's satisfaction with the policy outputs and through this, 
the index of pc «fical performance is obtained.
In addition -o the responsiveness element of performance, 
the concept of political stability must be included in the final 
measure. Political stability is recognized to be composed of two 
primary elements: regime (diachronic) stability, and governmental 
(synchronic) stability. Post World War II Italian regime 
stability has proven to be very good; while on the other hand, 
governmental stability has proven to be far below the average of 
Western democratic nations. However, below average governmental 
stability must be treated very carefully in the particular case 
of Italy. The Italian political culture suggests that 
governmental "instability” is constant over time and therefore 
cannot be weighed as heavily in the final measurement.
Just as some empirical data in research is based on opinion, 
the final index construction in this analysis is based on
10
judgement. The political performance composite index is 
constructed by weighting variable coefficients according to their 
positive or negative contribution to an overall performance level 
where
1 .00= strong positive
0 .66= medium positive
0.33= mild positive 
-0.33= mild negative 
-0 .66= medium negative 
-1 .00= strong negative
The variables are assigned values in the following equation
|2] P=-1.00(RIOTS)-0.66(IMPSANC)+0.66(RELSANC)-0.33(PRODEM)
-0.6 6(POLSTR)-0.6 6(ARMATTK)-0.6 6(DEAPOLV)+0.3 3(EXECADJ)-0.33(ASSAS>1)-0.66(UNREGEXT>1)+0.66(SUPDEM > 3)
where the weights are justified in the following key:
P= composite index of political performance
RIOTS = riots--the mo^ .t serious indication of demand 
unresponsiveness for any government. Riots serve 
as the reference or base weighting of -1.00. No 
other events represent a stronger
positive/negative contribution to P (ie. jRIOTSj >
[all other political indicators}).
IMPSANC = imposition of sanctions--a medium negative
contribution to P. The government considers the 
immediate situation serious enough to warrant 
control measures.
RELSANC *- relaxation of sanctions--a medium positive 
contribution to P. The opposite effect of 
IMPSANC.
PRODEM = protest demonstrations--miIdly negative
contribution to P. Economic conditions may or may 
not be the catalyst. Demonstrations are often 
organized by special interest groups that do not 
represent the entire population's demands.
POLSTR = political strikes--medium negative contribution to 
P. Since exclusively economically oriented 
strikes were not coded, this is considered very 
serious. Labor stoppages for reasons other than 
economic ones are not frequent.
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ARMATTK = armed attacks--miIdly negative contribution to p. 
Although often conducted by fringe groups, still a 
fairly serious indication of demands 
unresponsiveness.
DEAPOLV = deaths from political violence--medium negative 
contribution to P. Although violence is a serious 
indication of problems, it is not weighted as 
heavily as riots because the deaths may occur as a 
result of fringe group activities.
EXECADJ = executive adjustments--miIdly positive 
contribution to P. Cabinet turnover is often 
viewed as an indication of political instability, 
however, Italy's case is a rather peculiar one. A 
distinction must be made between regime and 
government stability. Regime stability in post- 
WWII Italy has been quite resilient in light of 
the strong perturbations that by all rights 
should have resulted in constitutional reforms or 
other regime turnover. Many authors see Italy's 
dynamic government coalitions (the give and take 
attitude) as instrumental in longer term regime 
stability.7
*ASSAS - political assassinations--miIdly negative 
contribution to P. Coded assassinations were 
always the result of carefully executed operations 
by extremist groups.
*UNREGEXT = unsuccessful regular executive transfers--medium 
negative contribution to P. If a challenge to the 
prevailing executive is mounted, it can usually 
be inferred that there are serious fragmentations 
and divisions within the polity. These are fairly 
strong indentions of government instability. The 
lack of leadership is also recognized as a 
disruptive factor in policy execution. This 
weighting is not inconsistent with that of the 
EXECADJ when its contribution to regime stability 
is considered.
*SUPDEM = support demonstrations--medium positive
contribution to P. Support demonstrations are not 
common and unless generated by government agents, 
they are considered as fairly important indicators 
of demands responsiveness.
7 For example, Joeseph LaPalombara (1987, 5, 14 15) and his 
emphasis on Italian politics as a spettacolo.
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(* dummy variables enable the inclusion of non-normally 
distributed indicators that are considered important to the 
composite index validity)
The raw composite index from equation [1 | is then standardized to 
m=0 ; sd=l
The composite economic performance index is also derived 
from an additive equation that is similar to a model developed by 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis." it is an unweighted 
equation with the signs of the variable coefficients determined 
by the indicators' effects on overall economic performance given
[3] E=GNP+INDPRO-CPI-UNEMP+WAGES+INDSHRS-CLOSRS 
where
E = composite index of economic performance
GNP = inflation adjusted gross national product. Measures 
the overall economic process of productive activity. 
Italy also has a large underground economy. However, 
the accounting standards remained constant :-fer the 
time period considered and therefore should not present 
a problem.
IN^Pi0 = industrial production index. Measures the more 
specific level of industrialization relative to 
agricultural output. Indicates the degree of 
ii iustrialization.
"See Zarnowi z and Boschan (1977) for a complete discussion 
on the BEA index. index's usefulness in predicting cyclical 
variations in ec n mi performance was examined and it was found 
that the composi e in lex is " tr aly significant” (Auerbach 
1981, 594). The BEA Index ures \ r able coefficients that are 
deviate slightly t rom valuer of ±1.0 but is Auerbach states, ”the 
extensive effort devoted * assigning and updating weights for 
the series inclu<fed has essei ially no effect on the resulting 
index; it is iistinguisha. e from one with equal weights”. 
Therefore the as ignments of equal weights to the Italian index 
should not damage its measurability; particularly in light of the 
fact that its purpose is not prediction.
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CPI = consumer price index. Measures the general level of 
prices/inflation. A negative contribution to E because 
higher levels of inflation 1 ) impedes capital 
formation by creating higher costs of capital financing 
and uncertainty for investors, 2 ) disrupts 
consumption by eroding consumer purchasing power and 
confidence, and 3) causes resources to be diverted to 
information seeking activities rather than production.
UNEMP = unemployment percentages. A negative contribution 
to E because higher levels (above the ’normal” rate) of 
unemployment 1 ) indicate inefficient uses of the labor 
force, 2 ) result in more unemployment compensation 
claims thus creating a drag on the economy, and 3 ) 
create pools of dependent workers who may eventually 
remove themselves from productive activity.
WAGES = wage levels. A positive contribution to E can
offset inflation. Measures the levels of disposable 
income. Higher wage levels can be considered 
detrimental to the economy by management since they 
represent a major portion of production costs.
However, in this analysis increased wage levels are a 
positive contribution to E because they indicate 
sufficient corporate profit levels.
INDSHRS = industrial shares index. Indicates the levels of 
investment activity. Investors rely on stock and bond 
valuation models that primarily consider growth 
expectations of industries and their own required rates 
of return on investment. In the aggregate, these 
models essentially measure the economy's future 
potential.
CLOSRS = business failures. A negative contribution to E
because business closures represent losses of economic 
units in the economy.
The raw composite index is then standardized to 
m=0 ; sd=l
Values for the respective final indexes are given in table 1
below.
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Table 1.--Composite Performance Indexes
YEAR ECON(E) POLtP)
1948 -0.7852 -1.7929
1949 -0.7631 -1.8019
1950 -0.8443 -2.6037
1951 -1.1258 -0.1303
1952 -1.5295 0.7062
1953 -1.4445 -0.1830
1954 -1.4691 0.1217
1955 -1.0788 0.6943
1956 -1.4687 1.0926
1957 -1.3502 1.1132
1958 -1.0400 0.8748
1959 -0.6584 1.0792
1960 0.1908 -0.2164
1961 0.5314 0.6250
1962 0.5347 0.1374
1963 0.6954 0.5454
1964 0.4046 0.8469
1965 0.3049 1.3687
1966 0.4312 1.3607
1967 0.5391 0.8827
1968 0.4580 0.4251
1969 0.8035 -0.5775
197C 0.9876 0.2171
1971 0.7142 -0.2450
1972 0.6585 -0.3728
1973 1.2486 -0.6344
1974 1.4144 -0.6319
1975 1.2601 -0.9121
1976 1.2047 -0.1559
1977 1.1759 -1.3990
Modelling and Testing
The two composite indexes are then plotted with E on the 
horizontal axis (independent variable) and with P on the vertical 
axis (dependent variable). A visual inspection (figure 1; the 
reader should note that all figures have X as the economic index 
and Y as the political index) immediately indicates that the 
relationship 1 ) is not logarithmic or even constantly increasing,
15
2 ) their is a pattern that indicates a positive correlation 
followed by a negative one, and 3) there are three distinct 
clusters of observations.
From the visual inspection of the plotted observations, the 
research hypothesis that f(E)=a+ln(kE) is rejected and an 
alternative model is suggested. Visually, it appears that after 
eliminating the three outliers, an inverse quadratic function of 
the form
[4] f (EHa-b(E)-c(E)2
should be fit to the plot and tested as the replacement 
hypothesis. Causs-Newton non-linear least squares regression is 
used to fit a curve. 9 The resultant inverse quadratic equation 
with parameters is obtained and given as
[5] f(E)=0.831124-0.542696E-0.551657E2
where the parameters are rounded to six decimal places (figure 
2). The goodness-of~fit for the replacement model is determined 
by the null hypothesis that
Ho : a=b=c-0; Hl : at least one parameter^ 
and the decision criteria is to reject H0 if 
(SSR/k)/(SSE/n-k-1)>F„ ,n k , to 0,
9A quadratic dependence is that P is determined by both E 
and E2 . The model given in equation (4] is simply a multiple 
regression equation involving three unknown coefficients, a, b, 
and c. These can be estimated by least squares. The model is 
treated as one relating P to a pair of ’’independent variables,” E 
and E2 . The equation can be written as P=a-b(E)-c(X) where X=E2 . 
Then hypothesis tests and confidence intervals can be obtained in 
the usual way.
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where SSR=regression sum of squares 
SSE=error sum of squares
n=number of observations (note outliers removed from model)
k=degrees of freedom
F~F-di attribution
O.OS^level of test significance
The calculated value (see table 2 below foi summary statistics)
for the test statistic is 10.09715*F. Therefore H0 is rejected
and the model’s fit is considered good. The partial regression
parameters are then tested with the hypothesis that
Ho :partial regression parameter-0 
H, :partial regression parameter?^
and the decision criteria is to reject H, if
(parameter/standard error) > + t. , ;
where t is the students t-distr ibut.ior.. The calculated values
for the test statistics are
a : 4.38> t“2.069 
b:-4.73<t=-2.069 
c:-3.59<t=-2.069
Therefore* the H,, are rejected and the partial regression 
parameters are good.
A visual inspection of the residual values (figure 3) shows 
a fairly uniform scatter thus indicating that the model does not 
exhibit hettoscedasticity problems. Under the assumption that 
the model is good* the calculated coefficient of determination 
(R ) value indicates that 55.8 percent of the variance in P is 
determined by E.
Table
SAS
NON-LINEAR
SOURCE
REGRESS I ON
RESIDUAL
UNCORRECTED
(CORRECTED
I EAST SQUARES SUMMARY STATIST!ICS DEPENDENT VAR 1 ABLE Y
DE SUM OE SQUARES MEAN SQUARE
3 8.793009354 0.931009785
1 OTAL 04 6.906736870 0.09028070307 15.769766024
1 )I AL ) 06 14.336788133
ro
PARAMETER ES T IMATE AS YMPT O T 1C 
S I D .  ERROR
A 0 . 8 3 1  1039005 0. 189680 76096
B -  . 542**950 749 0. 1 1480 748.888
C -  . 55 H 574083 0 . 1 5 3  73861987
ASYMPTOTIC CORRELAT ION M AT R IX  OE THE
CORR A
A 1.0000 - o . :
B - 0 . 5 9 9 2 1 .(
C - 0 . 8 3 6 0 O.l
Of
,0
0
ASYMPTOTIC 95 CONI I PENCE INTERVAL EOWfR UPPER**396*1500 3 30 1.0006006 1 76
- . 7 7964*4 1 7 795 -0.30574597 19 
-.86895576955 -0.2343590471
B
- 0 . 8 3 6 0  
0 . 4 2 4 9  
1.0000
- - j
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DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
Qua1 itative Ana1ysi s
Proceeding under the assumption that the methodology 
utilized in the analysis is valid* several points can be drawn 
out.
Point One. Upon the visual inspection of the initial plot 
(figure 1 ) made previously, it was noted that three distinct 
clusters of observations emerged. These clusters may be broadly 
interpreted as ’’regimes of operatin’’ of the Italian politico- 
economic system.1°
There is a cluster of three points corresponding to the 
years 1948* 49, and 50. This is believed to be a reconstruction 
regime of post World War II Italy. The nation was recovering 
from the wartime devastation. P was at its minimum levels while 
E was well below average. The national economy was in the
process of transforming from an orientation towards the
production of war material to the satisfaction of deferred, basic 10
SECTION 6.
10 It is useful to think of regimes as the phases of 
operation or types of component interaction of a 
mechanical/chemical/electrigal system such as an automobile. A 
reconstruction regime would be analogous to the starting of the 
automobile's engine. All the components of the system are 
operating under very abnormal conditions. The choke is engaged, 
temperature is low, oil pressure and viscosity is abnormal, etc. 
Then, as the system warms up, it is passing throu gh a 
reconstruction regime. The different components of the system 
are advancing towards their normal operating levels. The steady- 
state regime occurs when all components of the system are 
operating at optimal levels according to the design 
specifications and slight perturbations of the system are quickly 
corrected.
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human needs of its populace. Italy's political system was 
attempting to transform from autocracy to democracy. The low 
values of P most strongly represent the struggle among various 
proponents of democracy, the return of a monarchy, and marxism.
The second cluster appe.  ^ to be during a ’’kickoff regime". 
E was still at well below the mean for the time period under 
consideration. The nation's resources were being drawn into 
production, the economy was settling into a transformation mode, 
markets were being developed, and E was poised to enter a 
dramatic improvement. However, P had improved markedly to levels 
above or only slightly below the mean performance. The nation 
had settled upon democracy over monarchism, and the center 
rightist Christian Democrat party dominated the political sphere 
(albeit with constant challenges from the left). The nation 
seemed to be ready to enter a steady-state regime.
A third cluster corresponds to a period during which the 
economy was running at more "normal" levels of expansion and 
improvement. E improved very rapidly as evidenced by the lack of 
values around the mean. This in indicative of the extremely 
rapid industrialization often referred to as Italy's economic 
"miracle" . 1 1 However, P was in a steady decline. The rapid 
increase in E and the decline in P is where Italy departs from 
the normal path to a steady-state regime. The departure from the
1 1 Italy's economy suffered setbacks in the worldwide 
"stagflation" periods of the 1970s. The reader should note that 
the E advanced sporadically after 1959, actually suffering 
declines in several years. Nevertheless, economic performance 
improved in broad terms over the entire period.
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reconstruction regime to a steady state is normally a smooth, 
continuous process. Furthermore, all of the components of the 
system, in this case a politico-economic one, are supposed to be 
functioning at peak efficiency.
Point Two. The first derivative of f(E), given as 
[6 ] f '(E )=-1.1034E-0.5427
measures the rate of change of P with respect to changes in E, 
Figure 4 shows this relationship graphically. It is one in which 
the changes in P with respect to E are increasing at a decreasing 
rate until E=-0.49185 (about 1959), where it the began to 
decrease at an increasing rate. At the maximum value of P on the 
model, the economic performance was slightly less than its mean. 
After this point, the economy outperformened the government.
P9.Ant--Tlir.ee. The sensitivity of political performance to 
economic performance can be calculated. Sensitivity is a measure 
of relative change in P to relative change in E and therefore is 
not effected by units of measure. It is given below as
SK (P )=E[ f' (E) 1 /f (E )
and explicitly in the following equation as
(7] SK (P)=(-l.1033E2-0.5427E)/(-0.5517E2-0.5427E+0.8311)
P can be considered sensitive to E when the absolute value of 
S£(P)>1.0 and insensitive when less than 1.0.
The most important distinction that can be dawn from this 
is that P becomes extremely sensitive to E near P's mean values, 
which occur at two points: E=~0.81 and E=0.83. Furthermore, P 
remains sensitive to E untill E=-1.10 on the low end of the
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spectrum, and it becomes sensitive again at E=0.45. This 
indicates that the political performance is very sensitive to 
improvements in economic performance very early in the growth 
stages. But at a relatively early point in time the sensitivity 
decreases. On the other hand, political performance becomes very 
sensitive to further economic improvements at an earlier point 
than might be expected. Political performance is insensitive 
when the economic performance is at moderate levels.
Implications
The results suggest that the more rapid the rate of economic 
growth and modernization, the more li'ely it is that the 
political system will not be responsive to demands. Rapid 
economic growth could creates tensions between those whose 
economic position is improving and those whose are stable or in 
decline. A relationship between economic performance and 
political performance was stated by Samuel P. Huntington (1968, 
41), "those (nations| at the bottom of the economic ladder, tend 
to be less prone to violence and instability than those countries 
just above them." Italy moved off the bottom of the ladder in 
the 1960s.
The explanation for the decline in political performance 
could be that Italy's social institutions that provided stability 
and security for the individual and society were weakened due to 
the rapid economic growth. Furthermore, the prospect for 
improved individual economic position may have raised people's
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aspirations beyond their immediate levels of achievement.
H. Stuart Hughes (1979, 219 210) articulates well the trauma 
Italian society suffered during its rapid growth. Hughes states 
that* "in Italy the change came in a particularly fast and 
uncontrolled fashion; in the social as opposed to the productive 
sphere, governmental planning was almost entirely absent.” He 
also states that, "mote than half of the expansion in national 
product went to investment rather than to current consumption.1’ 
Apparently, much of the consumers consumption was not in the 
form of basic needs, but luxury and semiluxury items like 
automobiles.
Other scholars reenforce this prognosis. Sidney Tarrow 
(1980, 174-178) emphasises Italy urban social crisis of the 
1970s in six points outlined below:
I. The modern city is a relatively recent product and 
unprepared absorb the masses of workers from the rural South 
after 1945.
2. The industrial revolution occurred at a pace that did not 
allow for the replacement of the patron-client relationships with 
a more liquid one.
3. The new urban working class that was formed during the
1960s lived in the "faceless suburbs of the North.” This mass of 
undisciplined and often militant workers existed alongside the 
established well-organized and politically sophisticated workers 
of the industrial triangle (Milano-Torino-Genova). This created 
a volatile situation i: ich large sectors of the population
were demanding participation. It caught union leaders and 
government by surprise.
4. There was an expanded class of small-businessmen, lower- 
level bureaucrats, and administrators that were outside the 
political reach of organized labor, but also outside the benefits 
of the existing urban bourgeois socie ty.
5. A conflict of Catholicism and secularism that accompanied 
industrialization. Again, the suddenness with which the change 
took place resulted in severe problems.
6. A "convergence in time” between these trends resulted in 
the mass movements and protest of the 1970s.
Italy's rapid industrialization seems to have come at the 
price of the satisfaction of basic demands from the population. 
This resulted in the declining political performance seen after 
1959.
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SECTION 7.
SUMMARY
In the beginning of this study, the relationship between 
Italy's economic and political performance was hypothesized to be 
strictly a positive one, albeit at a decreasing rate. This 
hypothesis was tested empirically and rejected.
In the original model's place, the inverse quadratic 
function emerged, was tested, and accepted. It shows that Italy 
experienced increasing political performance in relationship to
24
economic performance, but only up to a point. After about 1959, 
the political performance decreases at an increasing rate. The 
economy simply outran the ability of the political system to 
respond to the increasing demands being placed upon it. Upon a 
review of literary works, one sees that the new model is in fact 
more representative of actual events in Italy during the thirty- 
year time period.
It would be interesting to see if this model would stand up 
to empirical evidence when new political data from 1978 to 1987 
is available. The relationship may actually be better
represented by another type of function (ie., trigonometric) 
where the level of political performance bottoms out and then 
rises again. Intuitively, this seems possible because in the 
1980s Italy has not seen the levels of violence and protest that 
was prevalent in earlier years.
In this study, the concepts of performance were 
operationalized using multiple indicators to obtain single 
indexes. Possibly, more accurate measurements could be obtained 
by using multiple indicators and multiple operationalization* 
The author feels, however, that for this study's purpose, the 
simplicity gained by single operationalization more than offsets 
any gains in accuracy.
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1.1--Political Variables
RIOTS. Demonstrations or disturbances that spontaneously 
become violent (see PRODEM).
IMPSANC. An action taken by the authorities to neutralize* 
suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of 
the government, the regime, or the state itself. This 
includes censorships and restrictions such as the 
mobilization of troops or arrests of persons involved in any 
typ* of political protest action.
RELSANC. A relaxation of a previous IMPSANC.
PRODEM. A nonviolent gathering of people organized for the
announced purpose of protesting against a regime or 
government or one or more of its leaders; or against its 
ideology, policy, intended policy, or lack of policy; or 
against its previous or intended action. Election meetings, 
rallies, and boycotts are excluded as are riots and violent 
demonstrations.
POLSTR. A work stoppage by a body of industrial or service
workers or a stoppage of normal academic life by students to 
protest governmental leadership's political actions. 
Economically oriented strikes are excluded.
ARMATTK. Acts of political violence carried out by (or on 
behalf of) an organized group with the objective of 
weakening or destroying the power exercised by another 
organized group. Three types of armed attacks were included 
in the coding were 1) by political groups, 2) by ethnic 
minorities, 3) by the state itself.
DEAPOLV. This is not really an event variable but a body count 
of people who have died in conjunction with armed attacks, 
riots, and in some cases, demonstrations. It does not 
include assassination victims.
EXECADJ. A modification in the membership of a national 
executive body that does not signify a transfer of formal 
power from one leader or ruling group to another.
ASSAS. Politically motivated murders of national leaders, high 
government officials, or politicians. Uncovered plots are 
not coded and distinction is not made between the motives of 
the assassin (ie: mental instabilities).
APPENDIX 1. Variable Definitions
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UNREGEXT. An abortive attempt made by persons not holding 
national executive office to obtain such office through 
legal or conventional procedures. National executive office 
refers both to individual leadership positions such as prime 
minister, and to the cabinet. The term Mregular” means 
that the attempt conformed to the prevailing conventional 
procedures of the political system.
SUPDEM. Regime support demonstrations are organized, nonviolent, 
and intended to lend support to the government, its policies 
and actions, or one of its leaders.
Political variable definitions were adapted from Taylor & Hudson
(1972) and Taylor A Jodice (1983).
1.2--Economic Variables
GNP. Inflation adjusted Gross National Product in millions of 
lira (from the Annuario Statistico).
1NDPR0. General industrial production index of manufacturing, 
power, and extractive industries (Annuario Statistico).
CPI. General consumer price index (Annuario Statistico).
UNEMP. Unemployment rate in percentages (Annuario Statistico)
WAGES. Index of average hourly earnings (United Nations).
INDSHRS. Index of market prices of industrial shares (United 
Nations)
CLOSRS. Business closures (Annuario Statistico).
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APPENDIX 2. Tables of Data
2.1--Political Data
YEAR RIOTS IMPSANC RELSANC PRODEM POLSTR ARMATTK DEAPOLV EXEADJ1948 60 15 2 11 17 35 13 1
1949 33 31 1 20 20 19 17 3
1950 38 43 0 21 20 18 14 0
1951 11 38 2 10 5 16 19 3
1952 14 44 4 9 4 6 2 1
1953 33 27 2 3 5 3 6 1
1954 11 22 2 0 16 0 0 1
1955 4 8 0 1 0 7 5 11956 11 5 0 1 0 1 3 2
1957 2 5 1 0 0 5 3 1
1958 6 9 0 4 0 4 0 0
1959 15 5 0 0 1 7 0 1
1960 25 7 0 0 10 5 11 31961 10 9 2 2 0 57 3 0
1962 20 7 0 0 6 17 9 2
1963 3 3 1 1 6 23 0 01964 3 4 1 5 2 7 0 0
1965 2 6 0 4 0 2 0 21966 8 7 4 3 0 6 4 1
1967 1 12 1 14 0 11 0 0
1968 8 3 0 16 6 3 2 01969 17 12 0 7 14 11 20 21970 17 10 1 14 10 12 7 01971 17 8 1 16 9 14 4 0
1972 10 30 2 6 7 28 4 0
1973 6 21 1 4 1 21 41 0
1974 3 24 4 20 9 42 25 11975 26 10 0 11 3 46 11 0
1976 4 4 0 0 2 27 21 1
1977 26 36 5 27 0 91 15 1
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APPENDIX 2.
2.l--Political Data (cont.) 
YgAR ASSAS UNREGEXT SUPDEM
1948 0 0 5
1949 1 0 1
1950 0 0 0
1951 0 0 1
1952 0 0 6
1953 0 3 5
1954 0 1 3
1955 0 3 0
1956 0 0 1
1957 0 2 0
1958 0 0 0
1959 0 0 11
1960 0 5 2
1961 0 0 8
1962 0 0 0
1963 0 2 0
1964 0 20 0
1965 0 0 0
1966 0 1 0
1967 0 0 0
1968 0 0 0
1969 0 0 *JL
1970 0 0 0
1971 1 0 0
1972 0 1 0
1973 0 0 0
1974 0 2 0
1975 0 0 0
1976 3 1 0
1977 1 0 0
Source: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research,
University of Michigan. Also archived on magnetic tape at 
the University of Illinois.
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APPENDIX 2.
2.2--Economic Data
YEAR GNP INDPRO CPI UNEMP WAGES INDSHRS CLOSRS
1948 16977 12.2 50.5 8.9 134 29.9 804
1949 18252 13.2 51.0 8.6 142 35.3 1250
1950 19422 15.3 50.5 8.3 143 34.7 2058
1951 20691 17.4 55.5 8.8 157 38.0 3070
1952 21047 17.6 57.6 9.5 165 44.9 4477
1953 22814 19.4 59.0 10.0 169 53.4 4160
1954 73815 21.1 60.8 10.0 175 58.8 4551
1955 25510 23.9 62.0 8.8 185 82.9 4747
1956 26899 24.9 64.4 11.1 198 80.7 4717
1957 28863 26.6 65.0 9.9 207 90.9 5667
1958 30257 28.1 66.8 8.1 216 90.9 5847
1959 32363 30.7 66.8 7.0 221 139.9 6775
1960 35339 35.4 68.1 5.4 232 209.0 6788
1961 38383 39.3 69.4 4.6 248 239.0 7240
1962 41250 43.2 72.8 4.0 286 203,4 7074
1963 44457 46.9 78. 1 3.4 334 175.4 6404
1964 45162 47.8 82.7 3.8 371 135.0 6223
1965 48154 50.2 86.7 5.2 386 133.3 5777
1966 51513 55.8 88.3 5.8 401 157.8 6044
1967 59492 60.0 92.2 5.3 426 145.6 6066
1968 59132 63.8 93.0 5.6 445 143.8 6652
1969 63871 65.7 95.3 5.6 489 159.6 6074
1970 68368 70.8 100.0 5.3 606 154.0 6101
1971 69515 70.8 104.8 5.3 703 120.0 6459
1972 72586 73.8 110.8 6.3 788 114.0 6154
1973 78047 80.8 122.8 6.2 966 147.0 5441
1974 81085 84.6 146.3 5.3 1209 135.0 5255
1975 82985 76.9 171.1 5.8 1794 100.0 4735
1976 89016 86.2 199.8 6.6 2133 52.0 4644
1977 90418 87.7 217.0 7.0 2673 67.0 4966
Sources: See the economic variable definitions for individualvariable sources.
Notes: All variables that had different base periods within their series were spliced to the same base period within their series. Raw data available from author.
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